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THEORY AND APPLICATION OF ROSCOE POUND'S
SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE:
CRIME PREVENTION OR CONTROL?
Louis H. Masotti* and Michael A. Weinstein**

I. Introduction
The current interest in reforming the administration of justice has
been triggered by a number of factors including the 1967 report of the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice1 and the treatment afforded arrestees during the civil disorders of
the past few years 2. The nation is alarmed at the reported annual increases in crime, and this alarm was manifested in the 1968 presidential
election when "law and order" became a major issue. Superficially the
answer may seem clear: more effective enforcement of the law and,
when necessary, more stringent laws. The critical issue, however, is a
jurisprudential-philosophical one: ought the "proper" approach to crime
essentially be its prevention through methods such as the rehabilitation
of criminal offenders, or its control through efficient administrative
procedures? This is not a new question in jurisprudence, but it remains
an important and unresolved one.
This article will examine an analytical approach to this problem which
was developed and applied by Roscoe Pound, one of America's most
eminent jurists. After describing and interpreting Pound's concept of
sociological jurisprudence, we will relate it generally to the reform of
criminal justice administration and analyze Pound's attempt to apply his
theory as -Director of the Cleveland Crime Survey of 1921. Finally, we
*Associate Professor of Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. A.B. 1956,
Princeton University; Ph.D. 1964, Northwestern University.
**Assistant Professor of Political Science, Purdue University. A.B. 1964, New York
University; Ph.D. 1967. Case Western Reserve University.
This-article is drawn from a larger study of the Cleveland Crime Survey, CRIME,
POLITICS & REFORM, to be published in the near future. The authors are indebted to
the Institute of Law and Criminal Procedure, Georgetown University, for financial
support of the project.
'NATIONAL

COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & THE ADMINISTRATION
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).

OF JUSTICE,

See Comment, The Administration of Justice in the Wake of the Detroit Civil Disorder of
July 1967, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1542 (1968).

[Vol. 2:2

Prospectus

will compare the recommendations of that Cleveland study and the
recent report of the President's Commission in a modest effort to assess
their impact on the administration of criminal justice and to draw some
lessons for future reform endeavors.

II. Pound's Sociological Jurisprudence: The General Theory
Roscoe Pound defined the goals of sociological jurisprudence in an
essay on the philosophy of law:
What we-are seeking to do and must do in a
civilized society is to adjust relations and order conduct in a world in which the goods of
existence, the scope for free activity, and the
objects on which to exert free activity are
limited, and the demands upon those goods
and those objects are infinite. To order the
activities of men in their endeavor to satisfy
their demands so as to enable satisfaction of
as much of the whole scheme of demands
with the least friction and waste has not
merely been what lawmakers and tribunals
and jurists have been striving for, it has also
been put in one way or another by3 philosophers as what we ought to be doing.
This statement contains a summary of Pound's program. In the perfect society all claims put forward by individuals would be immediately
satisfied. However, such a utopia does not exist in the world and people
cannot satisfy each of their demands. Further, men come into conflict
when they desire the same scarce goods. The basic tenets of sociological
jurisprudence place Pound in the tradition of Hobbes:
And therefore if any two men desire the same
thing, which nevertheless they cannot both
enjoy, they become enemies: and in the way
to their end, which is principally their own
conservation, and sometimes their delectation
to destroy or subdue one anonly, endeavor
4
other.
3

TWENTIETH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY: LIVING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

1958) [hereinafter cited as Runes].
4

T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN -105 (1951 Bobbs-Merrill edition).

69 (D. Runes ed.
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Pound articulated a conflict theory founded on individual interest. To
escape from a state of nature men devise systems of law which enable
them to fulfill "as much of the whole scheme of demands with the least
friction and waste." The legal system is made effective through a monopoly of coercive power:
I think of law as in one sense a highly specialized form of social control in a developed
politically organized society -a social control
through the systematic and orderly
appli5
cation of the force of such a society.
Thus, sociological jurisprudence introduces two components into its
definition of law. On the one hand, law is a means of alleviating conflict
through the imposition of organized force. On the other, law functions to
secure the realization of as many individual interests as possible. An
appropriate question arises here whether the second assertion is meant
to state a fact or prescribe an ideal. We will examine this question, but
for now we may accept these components as the starting point for
Pound.
Although the theory of interests was prefigured in nineteenth century
jurisprudence, Pound brought the approach to maturity. 6 He devised
categories under which to subsume the demands enunciated in social
systems:
If we take, as it were, an inventory of the
concrete claims which press upon the law for
satisfaction and seek to classify those which
the law recognizes and endeavors to secure,
they fall conveniently into three groups: individual interests,
public interests, and social
7
interests.
Individual interest are demands which particular people consciously and
immediately recognize as their own, such as a demand for
non-discriminatory treatment in hiring. Public interests are the claims
pressed on behalf of a politically organized society, such as the desire
for a new courthouse. 8 Demands of the social group are social interests.
These include the security of social institutions defined as the protection
5 Runes 67.
6 For the historical background of Pound's interest theory see H. REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE: ITS AMERICAN PROPHETS (1951).
7 R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 5 (1930).

8 Id.
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of economic, social and religious organizations; the general morals defined as the enforcement of social standards; the general progress defined
as the increase of man's control over nature; the conservation of social
resources defined as efficient use of the goods of existence; the general
security defined as the defense of order; and the individual life.9 The
social interest in the individual life consists of three demands: the desire
for fair opportunity and the interest in a
for self-assertion, the demand
0
minimum standard of life.'
Since the law operates through general rules, specific "individual
interests" or demands must be generalized before they are recognized as
legal rights." When generalized they become the social interest in the
individual life noted above. Thus, our example of non-discriminatory
treatment in hiring becomes a recognized legal right subsumed under the
social interest in an individual's "demand for fair opportunity". For
purposes of comparing and weighing interests, then, Pound considers all
interests on the social level. When we come to discuss the application of
the general theory of sociological jurisprudence to the administration of
criminal justice, we will see that the jurist is primarily concerned with
balancing the social interests in the general security and in the individual
life.
Sociological jurisprudence is not a simple philosophy and there are
many ambiguities in the argument as we have reproduced it in this
simple form. In order to understand better what is meant by an "interest", it is worth noting how Pound's concept of "interest" has evolved.
Contributions are drawn from several sources. Samuel Krislov points
out that all interests must be traced to individual activity;' 2 he emphasizes the danger that the term social interest might prompt us to believe
that society has desires.' 3 Pierre Lepaulle adds to the concept by showing that if interests are to be balanced they must be consciously expressed.' 4 Finally, Lester B. Snyder argues that Pound used an empirical method to determine his matrix of interests:
Pound did not ascertain these interests by use
of logical presuppositions about the ideals of
existence in society. Nor did he ascertain
these interests through a study of the fundamental behavioral tendencies of men. In a

9 Id.

'ld.
at 9.
11 Id. at 6.
12 Krislov,

What is an Interest? The Rival Answers of Bentley, Pound, & Maclver, 16 W.
POL. Q. 837 (1963).

13 Id.
14 Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law with a Critique of Sociological Jurisprudence, 35 HARV. L. REV. 845, 845-46 (1922).
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truly empirical fashion he has inventoried the
become embodied
claims that have actually
5
in our positive law.'
Snyder is quick to assert that although Pound's categories are generalizations of demands already written into the law, sociological jurisprudence allows the legal system to recognize new interests as they
emerge.' 6 The concept of "interest", then, refers to consciously articulated individual desires important enough to be recognized in the law.
If we examine more closely Pound's stated objective for the law, we
discover that it is somewhat unclear whether Pound is claiming that legal
systems always develop with a view toward satisfying a maximum number of interests or is prescribing a standard for evaluation among interests. To repeat, he defined the principal objective of a legal system as
follows:
To order the activities of men in their endeavor to satisfy their demands so as to enable
satisfaction of as much of the whole scheme
of demands with the least friction and waste
has not merely been what lawmakers and tribunals and jurists have been striving for, it
has also been put in one way or another by
philosophers as what we ought to be doing.
[Emphasis added].17
Julius Stone suggests at one point that Pound was describing the system
rather than prescribing for it:
So, Professor Pound, putting it for law, says
that in any given society its legal system represents an attempt to adjust the interests of
individuals with each other and with the interests asserted on behalf of society and the
state, with the least possible sacrifice of the
whole. 18
However, Stone does not maintain this position consistently:
He thus seeks to make feasible the evaluation
of the interests in conflict in a particular con15 Snyder, A Legal Philosophy for the Practicing Lawyer: Roscoe Pound's Theory of

Social Interests, 36 CONN. B.J. 22, 22-23 (1962).
16
Id. at 25.
17

Runes 69.

8

1 J. STONE, THE PROVINCE & FUNCTION OF LAW 357 (1950).
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troversy by reference to the manner and the
degree in which the whole scheme of interests is affected. 19
There is no doubt that Pound sometimes took the first of those
positions.2o However, such a statement on his part would certainly be
historically incorrect. That position does riot reflect the existence of
class legislation and differential treatment of groups by administrators.
Further, if legal systems naturally tend towards realizing his ideal,
Pound would not have had to direct a crime survey which was supposedly undertaken because the whole system of criminal justice had
"broken down." In this article we will consider Pound's discussion of
interest fulfillment as prescribing a standard by which to evaluate and
compare competing interests. It may be argued that this standard implies
that there are no principles through which choices between conflicting
interests can be guided. The most complete critique of this standard has
been undertaken by R.W.M. Dias.2 ' Dias argued that standards in legal
philosophy must be decisional principles rather than directives to balance interests. 22 He reasons that the administrator, judge or citizen is
confronted by a maze of interests in each particular situation. Some
must be satisfied, and others must be sacrificed. The injunction to
arbitrate conflicting claims by striking a balance between them cannot
point to a solution of the problem of which interests are important.
Rather, a decision, if it can be justified at all, must be subsumed under a
juridical ideal. Pound supplies no such ideal, argues Dias, and thus
leaves us where we were before the analysis began. Further, the theory
does not point to any recognition of new interests. According to Dias,
whether or not we are willing to listen to a new claim is a policy decision
and has nothing to do with balancing. Pound does not provide a procedure for judging which new interests we should secure. 23 Dias concludes
that ".. . as a guide to the administration of law the listing of interests is
24
unhelpful."
The criticisms put forward by Dias should not be accepted as a
refutation of Pound's philosophy. First, an accurate listing of the interests which gain recognition in our legal system is a valuable starting
point for a standard of evaluation. Pound at least has provided us with
categories defining the problems we want to solve. Second, the administration of justice involves elements of what Dias treats as decision and
19 Id. at 359.
Runes 69.

20

21 R. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE
22
2

24

1d.

Id. at 460.

Id.

458 (1964).
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what Pound calls balancing. Certainly police officers, prosecutors and
judges must often choose to sacrifice one interest at the expense of
another, and it is true that any rational justification of their decision must
be made in terms of an ideal with more substance than the principle:
"Satisfy as many desires as possible." However, there are many cases in
which a compromise can be made between conflicting demands, where
each demand is partially fulfilled and a balance or harmony of interests
results. Dias is too much of an idealist to allow for such a middleway.
Finally, Pound does have an ideal to which we refer choices: civilization. He attempts to provide the necessary jural ideals in the form of
a prescription to decide in favor of the development of civilization:
Instead of valuing all things in terms of individual personality, or in terms of politically
organized society, we are valuing them in
terms of civilization, of raisihg human powers
to their highest possible unfolding-toward
which spontaneous free individual action and
collective organized effort both contribute. 25
Civilization is defined in terms of the pragmatic standard of the free
development of all the potentialities of the human being. This is undoubtedly a vague standard. Yet it is hardly open to the objection that
men have the potential to kill as well as to create good works, for
Pound's ideal clearly implies some element of commonly-understood
values. The phrase "raising human powers to their highest possible
unfolding" rules out a static universe and substitutes an evolving cosmos
in which new opportunities for satisfaction are ever appearing. Demands
to maintain the status quo for the sake of preventing change can be
dismissed. The phrase gives the benefit of the doubt to experimentation
and is therefore liberal. It puts the burden of proof on those who would
stifle individual expression. In short, the standard of civilization does
guide the official in his process of balancing interests, although it is
concededly too abstract to allow him to find a ready answer in each
particular case. If a critic demands more of Pound than his emphasis on
human development, he is asking Pound to deny the open universe and
replace it with an unchanging moral realm which has little significance
for a modern industrialized society.
The concern with human development must always be tempered with
a knowledge of what most people are willing to accept. Pound claims
that "we must strive to meet the demands of the moral sentiment of the
community," and often pursue administrative activities which inhibit the

25 POUND,

supra note 7, at 10-11.
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useful expression of human potentialities. 26 There is an evident tension
in his standard between the ideal and the possible. On the one hand,
under theoretical conditions we must reject all demands for inhibiting
development unless good reasons are given to justify them. On the
other, to some degree we must defer to the dictates of public opinion.
To a large extent law depends for its enforcement upon the extent to which it can identify
social interests with individual interests, and
can give rise to or rely27upon individual desires to enforce its rules.
It is this tension in sociological jurisprudence which conditions both
Pound's critique of the administration of justice and the proposals for
reform which appear in CriminalJustice in Cleveland.

Ill. Sociological Jurisprudence and the Administration of

Criminal Justice
The application of sociological jurisprudence to a particular branch of
the legal system necessitates choosing certain relevant interests from the
general scheme of social interests. When the jurist considers the administration of criminal justice, he is primarily concerned with balancing the
social interests in the general security and in the individual life:
Criminal law has its origin, historically, in
legal regulation of certain crude forms of social control. Thus it has two sides from the
beginning. On the one hand, it is made up of
prohibitions addressed to the individual in order to secure social interests. On the other
hand, it is made up of limitations upon the
enforcement of these prohibitions in order to
secure
the social interest in the individual
life. 2 8
The sharp distinction between the desire that order be effectively
preserved in society and the demand that procedural treatment of individuals be closely controlled creates a conflict of ideals in criminal
justice which makes the problems of administration more difficult in this
sector of the law than in any other:
26 CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND

Id. at 575.
28 Id. at 577-78.
27

576 (R. Pound & F. Frankfurter eds. 1921).
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...over and above the general problems involved in all securing of interests by means of
the law, criminal law has special problems. It
must define absolute duties so as to preserve
a just and workable balance between the
competing social interests involved. It must
safeguard the general security and the individual life against abuse of criminal procedure, while at the same time making that
procedure as effective as possible for the securing of the whole scheme of social interests. It must devise effective enforcing
agencies, both punitive and preventive, while
at the same time giving due
29 effect to the interest in the individual life.
Pound is not satisfied with pointing out the interests which must be
balanced in the administration of criminal justice. He employs his ideal
of human development to suggest principles for evaluating which interests should be satisfied. For Pound, the ultimate solution to the problem
of criminal administration lies in the increasing use of preventive justice.
The goal of the free exercise of potentialities requires that we remove
the social and psychological conditions which produce crime instead of
punishing the "evil will" in penal institutions. 30 Punishment is an ineffective instrument for controlling crime because it does not treat the
sources of criminal activity. However, Pound did not claim that his plan
could be put into effect easily:
In effect, what there is in the way of preventive justice, in the domain of the criminal
law, is achieved not by legal but by extra-legal agencies. It is done for the most part
not by the agencies of the law, but by social
workers. In other words, we have yet to devise the machinery and learn
the technique of
3
preventive criminal justice. '
Short of the realization of a system of preventive justice Pound has
few suggestions for improvement. He remarks: "Until experience has
shown us the paths which we may follow with assurance, we must
expect ineffectiveness and dissatisfaction. ' '3 2 In Criminal Justice in the
American City Pound is even more pessimistic:
29

POUND, supra note

30

Id. at 28.

31

32

Id. at 35.
ld. at 25.

7, at 10-11.
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..until proper compromises between the interest in the individual human life and the
general security, security of social institutions, and general morals are worked out
at many points, there is likely to be vacillation, uncertainty and inefficiency in the administration of criminal justice. 33
Pound, however, did direct and edit the Cleveland Foundation's survey
of criminal justice. Therefore, we must assume that he held some principle which allowed him to engage in reform even though his ideal could
not be attained. For practical action Pound relied upon his proposition
that public opinion must be consulted in any evaluation.
Behind Pound's pessimism about the prospects for preventive justice
was an appreciation of widespread and deep-rooted attitudes in the
American citizenry. The most important belief frustrating the realization
of the ideal is that "legal and political miscarriages resolve themselves
into a matter of good men and bad men, and that the task is a simple one
of discovery and elimination of the bad."' 34 In order to catch the offender
and punish him Americans blindly set up a vast legal mechanism:
Along with the bad-man interpretation there
commonly goes a faith in legal machinery in
and of itself: a belief that when anything goes
wrong we should appeal at once to the legislature to put a law upon the statute book in
order to meet the special case, and that if this
law is but abstractly just and reasonable, it
will in some
way enforce itself and set things
to rights.3 5
Pound thus criticized the two dominant conceptions of reform which
were prevalent when he wrote: the demand to get rid of the rascals and
the faith in institutional manipulation. If he could have had his way he
would have substituted a scientific and humane system of crime prevention for these two remedies. However, he was aware that the best
practical measures would have to take both public opinion and the actual
nature of man into account, rather than attempting a creative release of
human potentialities based purely on individual self-help and self-direction:
The general security requires us to repress
self-help. Also we must strive to meet the
demands of the moral sentiment of the community. The considerations constrain us to
3
34

CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 587 (R. Pound & F. Frankfurter eds. 192 1).

Id. at 559.

3 Id. at 560.
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keep many things in the criminal law which
are purely retributive, and thus serve to preserve a condition of fundamental conflict between different parts of the system. Undoubtedly the law and its administration should
reflect the sober views of the community, not
its views when momentarily inflamed. But the
sober views of the average citizen are by no
means so advanced on this subject 36
as to make
a wholly scientific system possible.

Pound is an idealist and a realist at the same time. Confronted with
the certain defeat of his philosophy, which lacked the potential of
sufficient popular approval, he was driven to formulate a second-best
standard. His compromise incorporated the dominant reform motives.
The local conditions of cities demand centralization and organization of administrative
agencies, coordination of responsibility with
power, and reliance upon personality rather
than upon checks and balances as emphatically as a pioneer, rural community demands
decentralization, division of power, independent magistracies, and checks
upon adminis37
tration. [Emphasis added].
Thus, when it came to applying his legal philosophy to a concrete
situation, Pound rejected his standard of human development and relied
upon the dictates of public opinion. After studying his assertion that the
proper way to reconcile the conflict between the interests in the general
security and the individual life was through preventive justice, how are
we to understand his choice of a reform program with plans focusing on
the punishment of the evil-doers and on the streamlining of administration? We find that he concluded that the administration of criminal
justice was weighted too much in favor of the individual life:
The professional criminal and his advisers
have learned readily to use this machinery
and to make devices intended to temper the
application of criminal law to the occasional
offender a means of escape for the habitual
offender. 38
Pound believed that the legal philosopher should never neglect to consider the human material with which he was working in his calculations;
36 Id. at 576.
37 Id. at 593.
38 Id. at 592.
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the philosopher could express many beautiful ideals, but when faced
with a need for immediate reform he had to defer to the common ideas
of the time.
When Pound chooses such a "second-best" program of reform, he is
deferring to the possibilities of the time. However, there is evidence that
the tension between the ideal and the possible is an inherent part of his
theory of sociological jurisprudence itself. He attempts to combine in
one theory a pragmatic idealism and a pragmatic realism. -Pragmatic
idealism in legal philosophy is directed towards a rational ordering of
society through creativity and science:
The embattled interests, ideals and values are
found in the cultural environment; the juralpostulates are not found but invented in the
legal process. They are the legislators responding to the challenge of their generation
for a rational 3 ordering
of human life on the
9
juridical level.
At the same time the idealist approach employs ethics to establish
directions for development: "The functional approach to jurisprudence
involves the rehabilitation of an active idealism which subjects legal
institutions and legal norms to a process of ethical evaluation." 40 On the
other hand, pragmatic realism is conservative and stresses the importance of received values:
...we must note that Pound is not a pragmatist in the negative sense of much that we find
in James and Dewey. Pound insists on retaining all the intangibles in this business of judging conflicting claims. Not only must they be
judged in the light of the received ideals in
addition to all the enunciated social interests,
but this illusive and powerful thing called
"pursuit of justice" must have its play in his
4
system. '
It is difficult to reconcile pragmatic idealism and pragmatic realism in
the same philosophical system. In the present context one pushes towards the goal of human development while the other pulls towards
recognition of the limitations of the concrete social situation. Pound

39

Aronson, Roscoe Pound & the Resurgence of Juristic Idealism, 6 J. SOCIAL
PHY 82 (1940).

40

Id. at 69.

41 P. SAYRE, THE LIFE OF ROSCOE POUND 376 (1948).

PHILOSO-
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never adequately synthesized the two. Instead, he relegated preventive
justice and the release of creative powers to the realm of ideals while
adopting widespread contemporary conceptions of reform for his practical programs. Linus J. McManaman has remarked that sociological
jurisprudence was a revolt against the juristic pessimism which characterized nineteenth century Anglo-American legal thought after utilitarianism had lost its charm. 42 It would be more accurate to say that
Pound veiled a deep pessimism with a sterile pragmatism.

IV. Sociological Jurisprudence Applied:
The Cleveland Crime Survey of 1921
The recommendations for reform offered in Criminal Justice in Cleveland were applications of Pound's practical "second-best" standard
which called for "centralization and organization of administrative
agencies, coordination of responsibility with power, and reliance upon
personality rather than upon checks and balances," 4 and was designed
to ensure that professional criminals would not be able to take advantage
of the system. Throughout the specific reports on conditions in Cleveland we find numerous suggestions aimed at tightening the criminal
process so that offenders will receive their proper punishment.
In his report on police administration Raymond B. Fosdick wrote:
The best escape from the difficulties inherent
in the present scheme involves a complete
overhauling of the whole administrative machinery. In the first place, there should be a
direct line of responsibility, running from a
single head down through the whole organization. There should be no such short circuits
as now between the chief and mayor around
the director, who is the chief's superior. Final
authority, commensurate with responsibility
should be lodged exclusively with the single
directing head. This single leader should be
in immediate charge of directing the operations of the force. [Emphasis added].44
The reform proposals for police administration embodied each of the
components of Pound's practical standard. The goal of centralization
was pursued through the demand for "a direct line of responsibility."
McManaman, Social Engineering: The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound, 33 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 6 (1958).
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 593 (R. Pound & F. Frankfurter eds. 1921).
4Id. at 16.

4

43
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Coordination of responsibility with power was promoted in the recommendation that "short circuits" between the chief and mayor intended to
circumvent the director be eliminated. Finally, reliance upon personality
was suggested in the proposal that a "single leader" should be in charge
of directing the operations of the force. Other recommendations calling
for a separate police department with a permanent civilian head and a
chief executive officer, a consistent policy on promotions, a centralized
method for meting out discipline and the acquisition of modern equipment followed a similar pattern. The only recommendation involving
preventive justice was a proposal that a special service division be
created to study the breeding grounds of crime, experiment with new
methods and act as a liaison to social service agencies. 45
Alfred Bettman's report on prosecution also accepted the practical
standard:
Therefore the organization, methods, and
practices of the criminal courts and prosecutors and other agencies engaged in the administration of criminal justice should be
such as to function with as great an exactitude as is possible in an apparatus of this
nature and with a reduction to a minimum of
the opportunities for favoritism, corruption,
prejudice, luck, and carelessness. The procedure needs to be simplified so as to reduce as
far as possible the number of steps or stages
in which corruption, carelessness, or incompetence can play a part or which unnecessarily strain the resources, human and inanimate, devoted to the enforcement
of the
46
criminal law. [Emphasis added].
Bettman continued: "Our problem is, therefore, to suggest changes,
easily obtainable and available, which will effect such organization,
methods, practices, and prestige." 4 7 The same pattern of recommendations which characterized the report on police administration was
present in the prosecution study. Bettman suggested that the chief municipal prosecutor be primarily an executive official, that the county
prosecutor have the function of "systematizing" the activities of his
office, that the grand jury be abolished, that the bail bond system be
simplified, and that powers, such as "no-papering" which allowed the
prosecutor to drop cases without giving any reason for so doing, be
eliminated. All of these suggestions were aimed at administrative centralization, coordination of responsibility with power and reliance upon
45 Id. at 80.
4Id.

47

at 193.

Id. at 194.
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personality. All of the prescriptions were aimed at bringing offenders to
justice as efficiently as possible.
The report on criminal courts by Reginald Heber Smith and Herbert
B. Ehrmann did not depart from Pound's model. The authors asserted:
The evil of this overcomplicated system is
that it has become unwieldy. It gets enmeshed in its own technicalities and defeats
its own purpose. It fosters and makes possible the "professional" criminal lawyer, who
finds it worthwhile to test and tamper with it
until he discovers the weak spot through
which his client may escape. The system may
guarantee immunity for innocence, but it
tends also to guarantee immunity for crime.
48
[Emphasis added].
The remedies suggested were modest and practical:
There is no panacea for the existing ills nor is
there any royal road to democratic
self-improvement. These suggestions will not
bring about the millenium, but they are respectfully offered in the firm belief that their
adoption will effect
substantial and genuine
49
improvements.
The specific proposals were consonant with the general rule. Judges
should 'run against their own records; a unified criminal court should be
created; this court should have a chief justice; and a judicial council
should be set up to advise the court on ways to tighten criminal
procedure. The sole recommendation concerning preventive justice
called for an adequate probation staff which would play a supervisory
role: "To the probation force should be committed the task of collecting
fines, non-support orders, and the technical custody of persons adjudged
guilty who need actual supervision but not imprisonment." ' 50 Such a
probation staff would be a limited instrument for preventive justice if it
could be said to fulfill that aim at all.
Thus, the reform proposals contained in CriminalJustice in Cleveland
satisfied the requirements of Pound's "second-best" standard. Primarily
they dealt with the creation of centralized administrative machinery
staffed with capable and responsible persons. The contributors to the
study always kept in mind the goal of capturing and convicting the

48

id. at 359.

49 Id. at 364.
50 id. at 367.
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maximum number of offenders and eliminating any loopholes through
which the guilty might escape. The contributors did not claim that their
reforms would solve the problem of criminal justice. Rather, they believed that the measures which they suggested were the only ones which
could appeal to public opinion and still provide a degree of improvement
in the effectiveness of the criminal process. They were attempting to be
realists and were quick to argue that they were not appealing for utopian schemes. The ideal of preventive justice was sacrificed to the
dominant reform ideologies calling for organizational manipulation and
for good, responsible men. Criminal Justice in Cleveland was a result
clearly imprinted with the practical side of Roscoe Pound's thought.

V. Sociological Jurisprudence and Modern Reform:
The 1967 Report of the President's Commission
While Criminal Justice in Cleveland is usually considered the first
thorough crime survey, it was by no means the last. In form, philosophy
and methodology it was followed by major surveys in Illinois, Missouri,
New York and elsewhere, as well as by the Wickersham Commission's
national study in 1931.51
At the present time there is again a profound concern with the administration of criminal justice. In 1967 the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice issued a detailed report, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 52 which is very similar to Criminal Justice in Cleveland. Following tradition, the President's Commission articulated the ideal that preventive justice should become the
primary value served in the administrative process:
Finally, this report has emphasized again and
again that improyed law enforcement and
criminal administration is more than a matter
of giving additional resources to police departments, courts, and correctional systems.
Resources are not ends. They are means, the
means through which the agencies of criminal
justice can seek solutions to the 53problems of
preventing and controlling crime.
Expressing the principle that a "national strategy against crime must be
in large part a strategy of search," the Commission recommended that
the policy be implemented through formal machinery for planning estab51 NATIONAL
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lished by state and local governments. 54 In a proposal which recalls
the special service division suggested in the Cleveland survey, the report's major recommendation calls for an agency in every state and
every city which would be "responsible for planning improvements in
' 55
crime prcvention and control and encouraging their implementation.
However, while the formal ideology of The Challenge of Crime in a
Free Society includes the principle of preventive justice, the specific
recommendations stress the practical standards of institutional
efficiency.
Due to changes in the American ideology of reform since Criminal
Justice in Cleveland was published, the program of the President's
Commission stresses education of personnel and technological innovation rather than administrative centralization, "reliance upon personality" and "coordination of responsibility with power." For example,
police officers should be given special training programs "in such critical
problems as organized crime, riot control, police-community relations,
correctional supervision of offenders being treated in the community,
[and] the use by police and juvenile court intake personnel of social
agencies in the community. ' 56 Judges, prosecutors and defense counsel
for indigents should be given special educational programs, and corrections personnel should be given education and training in "experimental
treatment methods." 57 Expert consultants should be retained to conduct
"management studies" at all points in the administrative process because ". . . ineffectual administration can negate otherwise promising attempts to increase effectiveness against crime ..... 58 Information on the
patterns of crime should be centralized, and special demonstration projects should be funded "to show all cities and States how much major
changes can improve the system of criminal justice." 59 Finally, the
President's Commission was particularly interested in speeding the application of technological research and development to the problems of
criminal justice. Here the emphasis is placed almost wholly on
efficiency. Computers should be used to collect and analyze data "the
system needs to understand the crime control process"; two-way -radios
should be given to patrol officers; computer "command-and-control systems" should dispatch patrol forces; advanced fingerprint recognition
systems should be employed; and a wide range of investigative, warning
and control innovations should be explored.
The dependence of the President's Commission upon education and
technology should not obscure the similarity of its recommendations to
those of the Cleveland survey. At best, The Challenge of Crime in a
54
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Free Society gives more attention to rehabilitation than Criminal Justice
in Cleveland. However, neither survey makes a concerted attempt to
orient specific programs to the ideal of preventive justice. The policies
suggested are "practical" in the sense that they would tighten enforcement and alter existing organizational procedures to make administration
more efficient. The President's Commission retains the goals of sociological jurisprudence in its statement of purpose but, like the Cleveland
group, deemphasizes them when specific proposals are suggested and
relies on that which public opinion will accept, in this case, education
and technological research and development. The same problems which
characterized the implementation of Pound's ideal in Criminal Justice in
Cleveland seem to bedevil the report of the President's Commission.
While practical reform programs have shifted from involvement with
organizational relationships to preoccupation with technology and information, the fit between the ideal and the possible as reflected in recommended practice is still poor.

VI. Conclusion
Sociological jurisprudence did not become a powerful ideology of reform in the Cleveland of 1921, and it is unlikely to gain wide acceptance
among those who must actually revise the law in contemporary America. Pound and the other contributors to the survey tried to suggest
those measures which would be acceptable to the public, and in so doing
they failed to inspire a movement for renovating the administration of
criminal justice. The causes of their failure cannot be traced to the realm
of legal philosophy. However, the weaknesses in their philosophy can
provide us with several lessons which are relevant to current programs.
Pound's jurisprudence is characterized by a tension between the ideal
of human development and the necessity for taking account of public
opinion. In criminal administration, human development is expressed as
a recommendation for preventive justice and public opinion as a demand
for an effective administrative organization staffed by responsible persons. If we are convinced that crime prevention is the best way to
alleviate the difficulties which we detect in the administration of criminal
justice, why should we produce reform proposals which are not aimed at
the relevant variables? The only justification for such self-defeating
behavior is an assumption that the public will reject the ideal in favor of
more "practical" reforms. If this is the case, the proper method of
reform would be to attempt to convince the public that preventive goals
are the best. Unless we are juristic pessimists, we will not become such
hard-nosed realists that we internalize positions with which we cannot
agree in our reflective moods.
Further, it may not even be practical to adopt the dominant popular
themes of reform. Popular ideas may be unsound and inconsistent. A

April 19691

Sociological Jurisprudence

realist need not be one who follows the zeitgeist. Rather, he can be a
man who studies the political process closely and makes a prudent
determination of how to fulfill the greatest part of his program. The
realism of the Cleveland survey came to terms with certain Widespread
values as they were found to exist. A more intelligent and far-sighted
realism would mark out paths of influence to decision-makers. Pound
forgot that public opinion can be led. The successful reformer must find
the appropriate leaders and convince them that proposed changes are in
their interest.
Although the influence of surveys is limited, they would nevertheless
be an effective educational device to mold new opinions. The modern reformer who combines something of both the political scientist and
the philosopher jurist will seek through this device empirical support for
the ideals arising out of abstract but thoughtful reflection.
Sociological jurisprudence as developed by Pound provided the philosophical background for Criminal Justice in Cleveland. His view is a
legal philosophy that contains the seeds of its own destruction as it must
apparently resolve its inherent schizophrenic tension ultimately against
the abstract ideals from which it starts. Any crime survey done in the
future should not rely on such a weak foundation. A much better
approach would require careful clarification of what is really wanted and
what will be consistently sought from the beginning to the end of the
reform process. Pound's classification of interests does provide a framework in which such clarification can be undertaken. After the basic
values have been chosen, there should be no loss of nerve. It is both
hypocritical and impractical to sacrifice the fruits of reflection for popularity. It may also be unproductive if our deepest thinking tells us that
criminal justice should be preventive and we continue to propose reforms which emphasize only crime control. Criminal Justice in Cleveland may have been succeeded by The Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society, but the basic issue remains the same.

